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IN THE SllPRF:ME cnuRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF IJTAH,
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Case No. 19049
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information with two counts
of aggravated robbery under Utah Code Ann.,

E>

76-6-302 (1978).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried before a jury and found
guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery on February 17,
l9R3

in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake

County, State of Utah,
Judge, presiding.

the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,

On February 23, 1983, •appellant was

sentenced to an indeterminate term of five years to life in
the Utah State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the verdict and

judgment of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
on the evening of December 5,
robberies occurred just minutes apart
13, 25).

rn both robberies,

lqR2,

in Salt

twn ilCJ'1rav.1ted
l.ilke r'ity

r 1.

two masked men entered busi"'"'
)

and at gunpoint forced the employees

to open cash req1c;tprc;

and then lie face down on the floor while the men removed
money (T.

17, 19, 29, 30).

A witness who saw the suspect

vehicle leave the scene of one of the robberies notified
police that the car was headed up 5th East (T.
officer ward,

the

the

4R l.

a salt Lake City police officer,

spotted the vehicle coming towards him, and as
was able to get a good look at the driver (T.

it went
61).

by he

officer

ward, joined by officers in three other police cars, pursued
the suspect vehicle until it pulled into a side street and
collided with a chain link fence

(T.

64, 7R).

and driver of the vehicle jumped out and fled

The passengers
(T. 78).

The passengers, Leonard and Joseph Vigil, who were
later convicted of aggravated robbery, were immediately
apprehended (T.

65, 81, R2).

The driver, who avoided

immediate apprehension, was recognized by Officer Halterman as
appellant, whom he had known for three years (T. 77,

lnn,

108). Officer Fierro pursued appellant, coming within fifteen
feet of him before appellant ran into an apartment

115).

complex

Although Officer Fierro did not see which apartment

appellant ran into,

Fierro did hear a lower level apartmPnt

door slam (T. 115). After securing the apartment comrlex tci

-2-
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lr'1t1(1ss1~JJe,

wa<-.;

di' i*' l

,Joyce v ir:JI l

Sci 1 rJ;

ran in he re"

!

( T.

·r,

1 J7

l l

rJ011'

They found appellant
Yolanda Vigil
of

the apartment,
He

in fact

appellant.
6R);

trial

officer Fierro identified
114);

Officer Ward saw appellant
at the scene of the crash

appellant

(T.

jacket found

with appellant as the one worn by the man he pursued
(T.

and Lisa Rurkhart, Joseph Vigil's girlfriend,

that appellant had spent the evening
221.

231.

234).

into the

1521.

rn support of appellant's alibi defense,
Vigil

77);

as the man he pursued on

anrl officer DeWitt identified the

apartment complex

just

that the driver of

officer Halterman recognizPrl the driver as appellant

(T.

(T.

l q I I.

driving the suspect vehicle (T.

foot

entered

a sister to

know what he done.

t

Four otficers testified at
the vehicle was

J •

r nk"n out

'""'

"\';µ

other officers

11rlf1-iP1rcJ,

"'If

J,:-1 r1t

and

rwrupierl try ,Joyce Vigil,
, ;, 1

(

~·1>?rr0

Adrlitionally,

wit~

Yolanda
testified

Yolanda (T.

218,

Jose;:h Vigil testified that

appellant was not the driver of the suspect vehicle, but he
would not

say who the rlriver was

-3-

fT.

7n2,

203).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVI
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION.

DFNCF~

TO SIJPPORT

Appellant contends that the evidence introducPd ''"
the state at trial was insufficient

to support a convict i,-,ri

since the alibi testimony placing appellant with his
girlfriend created a reasonable doubt as to his whereabouts
during the commission of the crimes (See Appellant's Brief at
5, 6).

When reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence
claim the Utah Supreme Court has applied the following
standards:
This Court will not lightly overturn the
findings of a jury.
We must view the
evidence properly presented at trial in
the light most favorable to the jury
verdict, and will only interfere when the
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial
that a reasonable man could not possibly
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt.
State v. Asay, Utah, 631 P.2d 8fil
(1981); State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229
(1980); State v. Gorlick, Utah,. 1;05 P.2d
761 (1979); State v. Logan, Uah, 563 P.2d
Bll (1977).
State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982).
The independent identification by four police
officers of appellant as the man who drove the suspect vehiclP
and then fled from it toward an apartment complex, and who
minutes later was found

in the bedroom of an apartment

complex, certainly was sufficient evidence to support a
finding that appellant was with the robbers, and not

-4-

in th.it

It

r'rlnnot

evidence was sn
persor1

\._·r>uld

beyond

d

t)e successfully argued that this

lcirkinq or insuhstantial
r)(1'-~~1~·lv

n()t

rl'-,~asrJnahJc

['rl'';entati<>n of al1hi

automatically create a

Rather,

State v.

conclusion

a

testimony does

not

reasonable doubt sufficient for

Linden, 11tah, f,C,7 P.2d 1164,

1366 (l'lR3)

"The judging of the credibility of the witnesses and

the weight of
the

such

rParhPrl

reasonable

1(Ju~t.

More<)'.'er,

acquittal.

t1dve

that a

jury."

the evidence

State v.

is exclusively the prerogative of

Wilson, IJtah,

565 P.2d 66,

68

(1977).

The jury is not obligated to helieve the evidence most
favorable

to the defenrlant rather than that presented in

opposition by the state; and
evidence or of conflicting
upsetting the trial
649 P.2d 91, 97

the existence of contradictory

inferences does not warrant

court's verdict.

State v.

Howell, Utah,

(1982).

Finally, appellant suggests that the evidence
presented by the state was

insufficient

~ince

one of the

officers at the apartment complex was searching for a Tongan,
not a Puerto Rican,
situation does

Black or Tongan (T.

asked

Jf

this

Officer DeWitt had heard over the police

that the driver was male, with a

Officer new1tt

However,

not negatively impact_ on the sufficiency of the

state's evidence.
dispatch

appellant's nationality.

""'J,1

anyone had

71).

,,~,,

set'n

Tongans and Puerto Ricans

nurinq
thrit

large Afro,

possibly

the pursuit of the driver,

per·s"n

a Tnn<Ji1n

( T.

was

not Rlack and

234).

Si nee both

have dark complexions,

-s-

thus

DeWitt's

failure to attach the correct nationality to appellant

is <>f

little consequence when compared to the great weight of
evidence presented by the state.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO GIVE APPFLLANT' S
REOUESTED IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTION WHEN
A SIMILAR IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTION WAS
GIVEN.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by
refusing to give his requested "Telfaire" identification
instruction.

Twice in the past few months this Court has

reviewed this issue and in both cases, State v. Archambeau,
slip op. no. 18996 (decided March 26, 1984) (unpublished), and
state v. Newton, Utah,

, slip op. no. lCJOfi'i (decided

P.2d

April 23, 1984), the Court refused to require a "Telfaire"
instruction when eyewitness identification is an issue.

The

matter is left to the trial court's discretion if the jury
instructions adequately advise the

jury qn the law.

The

applicable standard of review, established in State v.
Schaffer, Utah, fi38 P.2d 1185 (1981), and reaffirmed in State
v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982), Archambeau, and Newton,
is:

If the jury is "instructed that the burden was on the

State to prove that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, that they were the exclusive juclges of the
credibility of the witnesses, and that in order to convict

-fi-

they rn11st

t1nrl

tr1at

rlc'fernlant

constilut1ncJ the offense,"
instruct.inn

is

intnrrn•--d

the

then a special

1c1ry that

thr·

irlentification

"Jewton, at 2.

rf,quirPrl.

not

111 ~i_ci_f_t__':'_r_,

As

committed all of the elements

the

instructions used

h11r·ien was on

the

appellant guilty beynnd a reasonable doubt
No. 7),

that the

jury acterl as

credibility of the witnesses
finally that

the

jury must

in this case

state to prove

(R.

84,

Instruction

the exclusive jurlges of the
87,

(R.

Instruction No.

10),

and

believe beyond a reasonable doubt

that appellant committed all of the elements of the offense
before convicting him
Moreover,
was given,

p. 2d at

model

issue

l lR 7 n . 1 .

Instruction No.

It

24

l"l).

(See Appenrlix A),

which

identical to the proposect "Telfaire"
See Schaffer,

in the Schaffer case.

638

is merely a conctensed version of the

identification instruction recommendect in United States

v. Telfaire, 4fi'l
indicate that
has

'lO,

Instruction No.

is almost

instruction at

(R.

F.2d 552

(0.C.

Cir.

1972).

identification is the key

issue,

the duty of proving identity beyond

and that the jury

is

( 1)

or knowledge,

the state

a reasonable doubt,

(2)

whether the

is a product of the witnf>ss's own recollection
anrl

(11

the consistency of

recognizing the rlr"ff·ndrint
AlthoucJh

that

the witness's capacity and

to observe the offencler,

iclentification

instructions

to appraise the testimony of the

eyewitnesses by consiclering:
opportunity

Both

thP "TPI ta ire"'

as a part Jc:ipant

i n--;tru-

1 1 >re

-7-

ts

the witness
in

in

the offense.

len;;thier than

Instruction No.

24 and adds a reminder to the

the credibility of the witnesses,

jury to cnns1.l<->1

these rlifferences are rniri<>r.

Therefore, appellant has no basis for complain1n·1
appeal that the jury was not adequately instructed wit~
respect to eyewitness identification testimnny.

Aeirl1t1nr•dll,

he has not shown that he was prejudiced hy the trial

cnurt'~

refusal to give his requested Instruction No.

~ppenrl1•

q

(See

B), which simply is a more detailed version of the instruction
actually given.

That is,

there is no reasonable

likelihooli

the verdict would have been different had his requested
instruction been given.
P.2d

see State v. Fontana, Utah,

, slip op. no. 17796 at p.9 (decided March 2, l9R4).

CONCLUSION
The evidence presented by the state, which

includerl

independent identification by four police officers of
appellant as the man driving the suspect vehicle and minutes
later apprehended by the officers, was

c~rtainly

sufficient

evidence to support appellant's conviction.
The trial court's refusal to use appellant's
requested identification instruction was not an abuse of
discretion; moreover, the instruction given adequately
instructed the jury with respect to eyewitness identificatinn
testimony.

-8-

Fnr these
affirm th•,

ver,11ct

reas<>ns,
anci

the state urges

J u<J,dm<"nt of
cubrc1ttP<i

the

this

OAVTO L.

this C0urt

to

trial court.
/delay of June,
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APPENDIX A

One of the important issues in this case is the identificcit ic'n "f th£' defendant

as the pernetrator of the crime.

The

Stare has the hurJcn of pr"ving identity, bevond a reasonable
do•Jb t .

It is not essential that the witness himself be free

from doubt as to the correctness of his

state~ent.

However, you

the jurv, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the
accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you mav
convict him.

In appraising the identification testimony of

the witnesses you should consider the following.
(a)

Did the witnesses have the capacity and opportunity

to observe the offender.
(b)

Is the identification made by the witness a product

of his own recollection or knowledge.
(c)

Have the witnesses been consistent in recognizing

the defendant as a participant in the offense.
If after considering these factors y~u have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identification,

you must

find the defendant not guilty.

·f:-_ I

l '>
l

APPF\NDIX

fl

the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.

f
~e

The State has

burden of proving identity, beyond a reasonatle doubt.

It is

Jt essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as to
~e

correctness of his statement.

However, you the jury, must be

3tisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification
: the defendant before you may convict him.

If you are not convinced

!yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who
Jmmitted the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or
7ression by the witness.

Its value depends on the opportunity

witness had to observe the offender at the time of the offense
to make a reliable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness,
should consider the following:
(1)

Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity

: an adequate opportunity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to
erve the offender at the time of the offense will be affected
such matters as how lonq or short a ti"e was available, how
or close the witness ••a', hO\·> goo3 ••err

11glitinri conditions,
'"

>· no1°; the

person in

past.

7G

(2)

Are you satisfied that the identification mciclc·

,

the witness after the offense was the product of his ov.·:1
recollection?

You may take into account both the strength of

the identification, and the circumstances under which the iclr·nt1f1,
was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been
influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant was
presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize the
identification with great care.

You may also consider the length

of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the crime and the
next opportunity of the witness to see defendant, as a factor
bearing on the reliability of the identification.
(3)

You may take into account any occasions in which

the witness failed to make an identification of the defendant, or
made an identification that was inconsistent with this identificaticc
at trial.
(4)

Finally, you must consider the credibility of each

identification witness in the same way as any other witness, consider
whether he is truthful, and consider whether he h~d the capacity
and opportunity to make a reliable observation on the matter
covered in his testimony.
It is again to be emphasized that the burden of proof
on the prosecutor extends to every element of the crime charged,

234222
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